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COMMENT
The Disaster After the Disaster: Insurance Companies’ PostCatastrophe Claims Handling Practices
I. Introduction
The recent surge of catastrophic events in the United States has unveiled the
insurance industry’s newly developed techniques for dealing with catastrophe
claims.1 In 2005, insurance companies in the United States and worldwide
suffered the most costly catastrophe year in history.2 Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
and Wilma—three of the ten most costly world insurance losses in
history—occurred in the United States between August 2005 and October
2005.3 Insured losses in the United States for the 2005 catastrophes totaled
$61.2 billion and more than doubled the record setting 2004 losses of $27.3
billion.4 Unfortunately, catastrophe losses are expected to double every ten
years.5
Currently, a single incident, or series of closely related incidents, must cause
insured property losses above $25 million to be classified as a catastrophe.6 In
2005, the Insurance Information Institute reported twenty-four catastrophic
1. The Insurance Information Institute reported twenty-four catastrophic events in the
United States in 2005. Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst., Insurers to Pay a Record $56.8 Billion
i n 2005 Cat as t r ophe Cl ai ms ( J an. 26, 20 0 6 ) , a v a i l a b l e at
http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press/ 749501/archive/press.749501/.
2. Ins. Info. Inst., Catastrophes: U.S., http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/catastro
phes (last visited June 13, 2008). The Munich Re Foundation, one of the world’s top
reinsurance companies, reported to the United Nations that preliminary estimates for world
insured losses for 2005 exceeded $70 billion. Climate Talks: 2005 Weather Disasters Most
Costly Ever, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/dec2005/
2005-12-07-01.asp.
3. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 2. The Insurance Services Office ranked August 2005’s
Hurricane Katrina as the most costly insurance loss in history, with insured losses at $45
billion. Hurricane Rita, September 2005, ranked sixth, with insured losses at $10 billion.
Hurricane Wilma, October 2005, ranked seventh, with insured losses at $10 billion. Id.; see
also Tom Ramstack, Insurance Group Touts Storm Plan: Critics Urge Reliance on
Catastrophe Fund, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2006, at C12 (stating Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma prompted $61 billion in claims by 3.3 million policyholders).
4. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 2.
5. Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst., Catastrophe Losses Will Double About Every 10 Years,
Says Leading Catastrophe Modeling Expert at PCS Conference (Apr. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press.753652/.
6. Ins. Info. Inst., Glossary of Insurance Terms, http://www.iii.org/media/glossary/
(search “Glossary” for the term “catastrophe”) (last visited June 13, 2008).
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events in the United States.7 The leaders of major insurance companies suggest
that unless the nation changes the way it handles major catastrophes, the
insurance industry will suffer economic devastation in the event of another
catastrophic year like 2005.8 Major insurance companies claim Hurricane
Katrina eliminated decades of profits and that the next major catastrophe may
result in insolvency.9 Nevertheless, the companies’ balance sheets from 2005
indicate that this doomsday prediction may be poorly founded.10 The insurance
industry posted record profits in 2005, even though 2005 was the most
expensive catastrophic year in history.11
Further, although premiums for homeowners insurance continue to increase
steadily, coverage is decreasing dramatically.12 The insurance industry claims
that remedying the problems and risks associated with insuring individuals
against catastrophes requires substantial premium hikes, scaling back
commitments in disaster prone areas, and an increased role for the government
in pre-disaster planning and post-disaster response.13 This comment analyzes
these suggestions as well as other techniques the industry used to reduce
financial exposure during the most costly catastrophic period in history. While
the recent catastrophes alone demonstrate the need for reform in the area of
catastrophe management, it should not be the government’s role, as suggested
by many leading insurers, to compensate the insurance industry’s
shortcomings.14 Rather, a close examination of recent catastrophes and their
7. Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 1.
8. Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst., Reforms Needed to Prepare for Major Catastrophes,
Insurance CEOs Tell Forum (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://www.iii.org/media/updates/
press.748575/.
9. Id.; see also John Gibeaut, Forces of Change, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 40, 42
(discussing insurers’ belief that another massive catastrophe or terrorist attack could
financially devastate the insurance industry).
10. State Farm reported a $3.5 billion pretax operating profit for 2005 solely for their
property and casualty line of insurance. Hurricanes Drive 39% Decline in Net Income for
Gi ant
St at e
Far m,
IN S .
J . ,
Feb.
26,
2006,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/02/26/ 65934.htm [hereinafter State
Farm Net Income]. State Farm also reported a $3.9 billion increase in their overall net worth,
raising their net worth to $50.2 billion in 2005. Id. Allstate reported a net income of $1.8
billion for 2005. ALLSTATE CORP., 2005 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2006), available at
http://www.allstate.com/investor/annual%5Freport/2005/pdf/ 2005AllstateSAR.pdf.
11. Peter G. Gosselin, Insurers Saw Record Gains in Year of Catastrophic Loss, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at A1 (reporting the United States insurance industry made record profits
of $44.8 billion in 2005, an 18.7% increase from 2004).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Kristina Herrndobler, Insurance Industry Frets About Mega-Risks: Companies Lobby
for Catastrophe Reinsurance, BEAUMONT ENTER., Apr. 2, 2006, at E1 (stating that insurers
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aftermath reveals that drastic changes in the conduct of responsible insurance
companies will pave the way to more effective and ethical management of
catastrophic events in the future.
Following a major catastrophe, millions of homeowners are desperate to
resolve their insurance claims and return their homes to safe living conditions.15
The difficulties claimants encounter during the claims process reveal the need
for reform and increased regulation in the insurance industry. Imagine an
elderly couple who just survived the traumatic experience of an F-5 tornado.
Although they escaped unharmed, the tornado destroyed their home and all their
belongings. Desperate to get their lives back in order as quickly as possible,
they submit a claim to their insurance company, who has insured their home for
the past fifty years. The couple patiently awaits a visit from a claims
representative and expects an assessment of damages by an engineer, settlement
negotiations, and an amicable resolution. Instead, the insurance company
recognizes an opportunity to prey on an elderly couple in their most vulnerable
state. The insurance company sends an ill-trained independent adjuster and a
biased engineer with a pre-constructed report to inspect the damage and
ultimately denies the couple’s claim. After months of arguing on the phone and
filing complaints, the insurance company agrees to send another engineer to
assess the damage. The insurer concedes the damage may have resulted from
the catastrophe and makes an embarrassingly low settlement offer. The couple
is angry and shocked and has to decide if they can afford, both financially and
psychologically, to keep fighting for their claim. The insurer, in a position of
superior bargaining power, holds its ground, waiting to see if the couple is
unwilling or unable to undertake the long and expensive process of litigation.
This couple, like many policyholders, is experiencing the real disaster following
a natural catastrophe —the insurance company’s claims handling process.
Although victims such as these consider themselves lucky to have survived the
disaster unharmed, losing nothing more than their property, they are unaware
they will be even luckier to survive unscathed the claims handling process that

are asking for government help in the event of another Katrina-sized catastrophe); Larry
Lipman, Florida Representatives Formulate Plans on Catastrophes, Insurance, PALM BEACH
POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at 9A (discussing insurers lobbying for a national catastrophe fund);
Ramstack, supra note 3, at C12 (discussing insurers asking state legislatures and Congress to
establish more stringent building codes and tax incentives to encourage property owners to
prepare for catastrophes).
15. ROBERT P. HARTWIG, INS. INFO. INST., 2004—YEAR END RESULTS (2004), http://www.
iii.org/media/industry/financials/2004yearend/ (reporting 2.2 million claims following a six
week span of hurricanes on the southeast coast in 2004); INS. INFO. INST., HURRICANE KATRINA
FACT FILE 1 (2006), http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/759496_1_0/Hurricane%20Katrina
%20Fact%20File.pdf (reporting 1.7 million claims following Hurricane Katrina in 2005).
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follows.16 This type of vulnerability creates an environment in which insurance
companies are able to take advantage of victims during the claims process.17
Stricter regulation of the insurance industry in Oklahoma is necessary to
prevent insurance companies from taking advantage of catastrophe victims
during the claims process. This can be accomplished through restructuring the
Oklahoma Department of Insurance, making the Insurance Commissioner an
advocate for policyholders, and utilizing the Oklahoma Attorney General’s
power to implement criminal charges as a means of regulation. The penalties
enforceable by the Insurance Commissioner combined with the threat of
criminal prosecution will internalize the costs of insurance companies’
wrongdoings, thereby discouraging future violations. Ideally, increased
regulation will bring the insurance industry’s behavior into accord with existing
Oklahoma insurance law. Part II of this comment examines Oklahoma’s
current laws and regulations that are designed to prevent fraud in insurance
claims handling practices. Part II also examines insurance company practices
that go unchecked in the catastrophe context, despite the current regulations.
Parts III and IV provide a detailed analysis of ways in which these practices
have and will continue to hurt Oklahomans if left unchecked. Specifically, part
III argues that insurance companies use catastrophes as an opportunity to
engage in bad faith and fraud by denying, delaying, and underpaying
catastrophe claims. Part IV discusses the methods insurance companies use to
avoid much of the burden of catastrophes by shifting the risk to policyholders,
the government, and reinsurance companies. Finally, Part V identifies possible
remedies for aligning the behavior of insurance companies with Oklahoma’s
16. This hypothetical was derived from an accumulation of sources. See generally Anita
Lee, ‘I Felt Like We Were Being Unfair’: State Farm Stand Stuns Adjuster, SUN HERALD
(Biloxi, Miss.), Sept. 23, 2006, at A1 (describing an 82-year-old man and his 79-year-old wife
who “took the news hard” when their claim was denied following Hurricane Katrina, even
though he carried $800,000 in coverage and was told by his agent that he had “no worries”;
during mediation, the mediator expressed embarrassment when conveying the insurer’s
$50,000 offer for a house that required more than $700,000 to be restored); State Farm Ins.
Co., How Doe s t h e Ca t a s t r op he Claim Process Work?,
http://www.statefarm.com/insurance/claim_ center/catinfo/catinfo.asp (last visited June 13,
2008) (describing the claims process in three easy steps: (1) report your claim, (2) damage
assessment, and (3) settlement).
17. In a recent Oklahoma jury verdict, such predatory conduct by one insurance company
was condemned. Watkins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CJ-2000-303 (Okla. Dist. Ct.
May 25, 2006), appeal docketed, No. DF-103756 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 13, 2006), appeal
dismissed per stipulation, verdict vacated and confidential settlement entered, No. DF-103756
(Jan. 12, 2007). The jury unanimously found that State Farm not only recklessly disregarded
its duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with policyholders by using a biased engineering
firm and independent adjusters, but also intentionally and with malice breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing by using these entities. Id.
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existing insurance laws, thereby encouraging insurers to fully, and in good faith,
indemnify claimants following catastrophes.
II. General Insurance Claims Handling Practices
Following a catastrophe, the victims’ first step towards restoration is
submitting a claim to the insurance company. To do this, the catastrophe victim
makes a notification of claim, informing the insurer of the facts giving rise to
the claim.18 By notifying the insurance company, the victim becomes a first
party claimant, an individual asserting a right to payment pursuant to the
claimant’s insurance policy.19 Often, insurance companies establish catastrophe
teams near the area of the catastrophe to provide access for victims to make the
notification of claim. This, however, is just the beginning of the claims process.
After the insured makes a notification of claim, damage assessment begins.20
During this crucial phase of the claim process, policyholders inventory personal
belongings, contractors and engineers conduct investigations and generate
reports regarding the damaged property, and adjusters prepare assessments of
the covered losses and estimate the amount owed to the policyholder.21 Once
the claims adjusters determine the value of the loss, the settlement process
begins.22 During the settlement process, the insurance company, theoretically,
pays the claimant the amount necessary to repair or replace the claimant’s
property in accordance with the terms and conditions of the policy.23 In the
event that a settlement of the claim cannot be reached, litigation often ensues.
Although the above depiction of the claims process appears simplistic and easily
administered, the process is often fraught with problems. These problems range
from misinterpretation of policy language to deliberate denials or underpayment
of claims.
Because insurance claim handling has great potential for misconduct, the
Oklahoma legislature implemented strict regulations to ensure good faith
conduct on the part of insurance companies. The Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act regulates insurance companies’ claims handling practices by
identifying unacceptable conduct.24 Common violations in catastrophe claims
18. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.2(8) (2001).
19. Id. § 1250.2(4).
20. State Farm Ins. Co., The Catastrophe Claim Process Made Simple, http://www.state
farm.com/insurance/claim_center/catinfo/ins_claims_home_catas_process.asp (last visited
June 13, 2008).
21. Id.
22. State Farm Ins. Co., supra note 16.
23. State Farm Ins. Co., supra note 20.
24. See 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5.
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include: failing to disclose pertinent benefits; failing to attempt a prompt, fair,
and equitable settlement; misrepresenting pertinent facts or policy provisions;
and failing to adopt reasonable standards for prompt investigation of claims.25
The Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act states that the failure to disclose
to a claimant benefits or coverage provided by the policy, when such benefits
or coverage are pertinent to a claim, constitutes an unfair claims settlement
practice.26 For example, an insurance company’s failure to disclose additional
living expenses or overhead and profit benefits to a policyholder following a
catastrophe violates the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. Additionally,
after liability has become reasonably clear, the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act provides that the insurance company commits a violation if the
company fails to make a good faith attempt to effectuate “prompt, fair and
equitable settlement” of claims.27 Therefore, an insurance company that
engages in conduct to delay or underpay claims violates the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act. Further, an insurance company commits a violation
if the company knowingly misrepresents pertinent facts or policy provisions to
the policyholder.28 For example, replacement cost provisions are easily
misrepresented to policyholders. An insurance company that exercises a twostep process for paying replacement cost benefits,29 but represents the process
as a one-step process through its agents and marketing materials, violates the
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act when the company knows the policy is
being misrepresented to the policyholder.30 The Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act also provides that “[f]ailing to adopt and implement reasonable
standards for prompt investigations of claims” constitutes a violation.31 For
example, an insurance company that hires a biased engineering firm to conduct
outcome-oriented “investigations” of damaged property following a catastrophe
violates the reasonable standard set forth in the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act. Although these provisions are not the only laws regulating unfair
claims settlement practices, they represent the regulations that pertain to the
insurance companies’ conduct discussed in this comment.
The Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner is charged with implementation and
administration of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.32 The
25. Id.
26. Id. § 1250.5(1).
27. Id. § 1250.5(4).
28. Id. § 1250.5(2).
29. See infra Parts III.A.2 & IV.A (discussing replacement cost coverage and the process
for paying replacement cost benefits).
30. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(2).
31. Id. § 1250.5(3).
32. Id. § 1250.16.
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investigative authority vested in the Insurance Commissioner provides an
additional protection for the claims process.33 The Oklahoma Insurance Code
provides that insurance companies’ claim files must contain sufficiently detailed
notes and paperwork and are subject to examination by the Insurance
Commissioner.34 This broad authority gives the Insurance Commissioner the
ability to investigate the claims practices of insurers and enforce appropriate
remedies that range from requiring insurers to file periodic reports to issuing
cease and desist orders.35
The Oklahoma Insurance Code mandates that the Insurance Commissioner
issue a cease and desist order when an insurance company is found to be in
violation of any provision of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.36 The
Oklahoma Insurance Code further provides that the Insurance Commissioner
“shall have the authority to revoke or suspend the insurer’s certificate of
authority” if the insurer fails to comply with the order.37 Furthermore, the
Insurance Commissioner has the power to limit, regulate, and control an
insurance company’s line of business and volume of business, as well as the
power to seek the assistance of the Attorney General to enforce the Insurance
Commissioner’s order.38 Under existing laws, Oklahoma appears to be
sufficiently equipped with the tools necessary to bring the insurance industry’s
claims handling behavior into accord with Oklahoma’s Insurance Code—it is
the enforcement of existing laws that is lacking. Failure to adequately enforce
the existing laws creates an environment in which insurance companies engage
in wrongful and illegal claims settlement practices.
III. Catastrophes Create Opportunities for Insurance Companies to Engage
in Bad Faith and Fraud
A. First Party Bad Faith
An insurance company commits bad faith when it unreasonably and
unfoundedly refuses to provide coverage in violation of its duties of good faith
and fair dealing.39 First party bad faith occurs when the insurance company
refuses to settle a policyholder’s individual claim in accordance with duties of
good faith and fair dealing that is brought by a policyholder asserting a claim.40
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. § 1250.4.
Id.
Id. §§ 1250, 1250.13.
Id. § 1250.13.
Id.
Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 149 (8th ed. 2004).
CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 400-01 (5th ed. 2003)
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Catastrophe victims have alleged bad faith against insurance companies for
intentionally denying, delaying, and underpaying claims.41
1. The Squeaky Wheel Gets the Oil: The Policy of Standard Denial
Following catastrophes, insurance companies often implement a policy of
standard denial, which requires insurance adjusters to deny a policyholder’s
first claim as a means of gauging the policyholder’s willingness to haggle with
the insurance company.42 If the policyholder accepts the denial, the insurance
company retains all of the money owed to the policyholder. In essence, an
insurance company can eliminate claims by issuing sweeping denials under the
presumption that some policyholders will accept the denial without question.
Policyholders who refuse the denial and choose to pursue their claim through
litigation, however, may face “mad dog defense tactics” that keep the
policyholders preoccupied with court motions, thereby frustrating
policyholders’ ability to pursue their claims.43 In addition, litigating insurance
bad faith claims has become so expensive and time consuming, policyholders
—as well as attorneys—are becoming increasingly unwilling to fight insurance

(distinguishing between a first party claim and a third party claim). A first party bad faith
claim is when the insured seeks to recover damages due to the insurance company’s bad faith
refusal to settle a claim brought by the insured. A third party bad faith claim is when the
insured seeks to recover damages due to the insurance company’s bad faith refusal to settle a
claim brought by a third party against the insured. Id.; see also 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.2(4)
(defining “first party claimant” as an “individual . . . asserting a right to payment pursuant to
an insurance policy”).
41. Anita Lee, Top Execs of State Farm are Targeted: Judge Broadens Wind-Water Suit,
SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Jan. 11, 2007, at A1 (discussing 200 lawsuits and 640 claims
pending settlement resulting from claims denied based on a wind-water protocol issued by
State Farm); see also Amended Complaint, Watkins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CJ2000-303 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 25, 2006) (alleging defendants engaged in a scheme to delay,
deny, or underpay claims by repeatedly engaging the engineering services of Haag Engineering
while knowing Haag Engineering was predetermined to disagree with the policyholders),
appeal docketed, No. DF-103756 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 13, 2006), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, verdict vacated and confidential settlement entered, No. DF-103756 (Jan. 12,
2007).
42. See Michael Kunzelman, State Farm Contractors Testify in Probe, TULSA WORLD,
Jan. 19, 2007, at E3 (discussing internal documents turned over by two whistleblowers
showing that State Farm manipulated documents so that claims could be denied).
43. Guy Kornblum, Remarks at the 1986 Divisional Claim Superintendents Conference
17 (Nov. 18, 1986) (transcript on file with author) (describing a strategy of keeping plaintiffs
tied up in law and motions for months and referring to it as “mad dog defense tactics”).
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companies.44 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, several
policyholders joined forces to collectively fight for their claims.45
Within weeks of Hurricane Katrina, State Farm implemented a protocol,
drafted by a claims consultant and edited by in-house attorneys, shifting the
burden of proving the cause of loss to policyholders.46 By shifting the burden
of proof, State Farm effectively issued a standard denial to policyholders faced
with the impossible burden of proving whether their property was destroyed by
Hurricane Katrina’s wind, which was covered under the policy, or water, which
was excluded.47 Although the insurance policy provided that the insurance
company carries the burden of proving the cause of loss, by shifting the burden,
State Farm was able to deny claims simply because policyholders could not
prove water was not the cause of the damage.48 Fortunately for policyholders,
a Mississippi court recently held that it was unacceptable for insurance
companies to deny claims under this burden shifting protocol.49 In an order
granting a policyholder judgment as a matter of law, the court held that the
burden of proof remains on the insurance company to establish that the portion
of the loss sought to be excluded was attributable to flooding and rising water,
thereby making State Farm’s protocol unenforceable.50
A policy of standard denial constitutes first party bad faith by unreasonably
and unfoundedly refusing to provide coverage to policyholders.51 In an order
awarding punitive damages against State Farm, a Utah judge stated that State
Farm
is able to pressure its adjusters to deny consumers insurance benefits
with impunity, knowing: (1) that few of its victims will even realize
that they have been wronged; (2) that fewer still will ever be able to
sue; (3) that only a small fraction of those who do sue will be able
to weather the years of litigation needed to reach trial; and (4) that
any victims who do actually reach trial will have great difficulty

44. Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Insurance Surprises (CNN television broadcast Feb.
7, 2007), transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0702/07/acd.02.
html (quoting former Allstate attorney describing Allstate’s strategy to make fighting the
company “so expensive and so time-consuming that lawyers would start refusing to help
clients”).
45. See Lee, supra note 41, at A1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Opinion on Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Broussard v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV6 LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 113942 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 11, 2007).
50. Id.
51. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 149 (8th ed. 2004).
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establishing the basis for punitive damages when met with claims
that only an “honest mistake” was made . . . .52
The standard denial of claims following catastrophe is just the beginning of a
the fraudulent claims practices. Insurance companies have created an
“impenetrable wall of defense,” through which the odds are overwhelmingly
against policyholders attempting to recover for wrongful claims handling
procedures and practices.53
2. Time Is Money: The Policy of Delay
When dealing with large amounts of money, time is of the essence. Part of
the present value of money is the ability to invest it, earning a rate of return
proportional to the risk of the investment. Insurance companies that control
billions of dollars are able to earn substantial interest on the company’s assets.
Because the potential for generating profit by retaining money for a period of
time exists, insurance companies have an incentive to delay paying claims to
policyholders.54 The longer an insurance company extends the process of
settling claims, the more interest is accrued on policyholders’ money.
To delay payment, insurance companies first delay appraisal of the damage.
Often, after a catastrophe, policyholders’ homes are subjected to multiple
structural engineering inspections.55 Whether because the insurance company
waits for an agreeable report,56 or because the policyholder is forced to insist
on a fair assessment by a public appraiser,57 multiple inspections result in
delayed payment. Even though failing to implement prompt investigations of

52. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 890905231, slip op. ¶ 47 (Utah
Dist. Ct. Aug. 3, 1998), available at http://graham.main.nc.us/~bhammel/CASES/CvSF.pdf.
53. Id.
54. See Press Release, Miss. Att’y Gen. Jim Hood, Katrina Insurance Case Remanded to
State Courts (Mar. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Katrina Case Press Release], available at http://
www.ago.state.ms.us/index.php/press/releases/katrina_insurance_case_remanded_to_state
_courts/ (discussing the Mississippi Attorney General’s interest in knowing how much money
insurance companies save by retaining policyholders’ money).
55. Case Preparation for Insurance Coverage Disputes, ON THE SCENE: CED ELECTRONIC
NEWS BULL., Feb. 5, 2007, http://www.ced-aai.com/onthescene_disp.asp?rk=34 [hereinafter
Case Preparation] (discussing the requirement that an insurance company’s decision to deny
a claim must be based on a thorough investigation surrounding the claim, warning of the
potential for bias when using an in-house insurance company’s engineer, and suggesting the
use of an impartial inquiry based on all the facts).
56. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing insurance companies hiring biased structural
engineering firms to create outcome-oriented reports).
57. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing policyholders having to pay to retain their own
engineering firm or rely on a public adjuster to assure a fair investigation).
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claims violates Oklahoma’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act58 and
similar legislation in other states,59 insurance companies continue to delay
investigations because of their ability to leverage assets, earning tremendous
profit from the delay.
Other techniques used by insurance companies to delay claim settlement
include withholding “overhead and profit,” a benefit that pays an additional
amount beyond the claim to cover the costs of a general contractor to coordinate
the repairs, and “additional living expenses,” a benefit providing coverage when
temporary shelter is necessary; both of which are discussed in detail below.60
Another profitable delay tactic is the withholding of replacement cost coverage
which is intended to provide a sum of money sufficient to replace damaged
property “without deducting for depreciation.”61 Insurance companies across
the nation have switched to a two-step process for paying replacement cost
coverage.62 First, after liability for the claim arises, the insurance company
pays the policyholder the actual cash value of the damaged property, which is
the value of the property in its existing, damaged condition.63 Second, after the
policyholder incurs and documents the full costs of repairs by spending his or
her own money, the insurance company pays the remaining benefits, referred to
as “holdback” money, to the policyholder.64 Although the purpose of a
replacement cost policy is to avoid depreciation and ensure policyholders
sufficient coverage to repair or replace their property, under the two-step
process of paying replacement cost benefits, the property is depreciated because
policyholders initially only receive actual cash value.65 Through this method of
58. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(3) (2001).
59. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-20(C) (West 1978); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §
542.003(4) (Vernon 2005).
60. See infra Part III.A.3.
61. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 6 (search “Glossary” for the term “replacement cost”).
62. See JOHN A. BISHOP, SR. & TIM SPEIGHT, HOMEOWNER POLICY COVERAGE A:
BENEFITS PAID UPFRONT 1 (2000) (“In the majority of states and provinces structural damage
claims are settled by initially issuing an Actual Cash Value payment (the cost of covered
repairs less applicable depreciation) until the policyholder has actually incurred the full cost
of the covered repairs. Once these replacement costs have been incurred and documented by
the policyholder, the difference between the initial payment(s) and the necessary cost to repair
covered damages is paid to the policyholder.”).
63. See id.; see also Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 6 (search “Glossary” for the term “actual
cash value”).
64. See BISHOP & SPEIGHT, supra note 62, at 1.
65. A sample homeowners policy, produced by the Insurance Services Office (ISO),
provides a guideline of the terms and conditions generally included in fire and property
insurance policies. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 175 (4th ed.
2005). The ISO sample policy contains a Loss Settlement section describing the criteria for
receiving replacement cost coverage and includes a provision, like most homeowners policies,
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paying replacement cost benefits, insurance companies have effectively revoked
the benefits of the replacement cost policy. If policy holders are unaware of the
two-step process, do not have funds to undertake the necessary repairs, or miss
the limited window in which they must make repairs to take advantage of the
policy, the policy holders lose their opportunity to claim the full replacement
cost benefits. This two-step process of indemnifying policyholders is a windfall
for the insurance company. In the event the policyholder never repairs or
replaces the damaged property, the insurance company retains the higher
premiums it received from the replacement cost policy but only pays actual cash
value for the loss because the insurance company never makes the holdback
payment. Further, even if the insurance company makes the holdback payment,
the two-step process allows the insurance company to earn significant interest
on the holdback money between the time of the claim and the actual repair or
replacement of the damaged property.
Insurance companies also engage in delay tactics after the claim escalates to
litigation. For example, insurance companies—including State Farm, Allstate,
Farm Bureau, USAA, and Nationwide—attempted to delay litigation regarding
Hurricane Katrina claims by removing the cases to federal court. 66 In recent
press releases, Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood stated that insurance
companies “were wrong in trying to delay the case in federal court”67 and stated
that he would be interested “to know how much money they’ve saved
themselves [by] holding on to these people’s money.”68 Even after cases are
remanded, insurers continue their delay tactics in state court. For example,
insurance companies refuse to produce discovery after being ordered by the
court to do so and instruct witnesses not to answer questions during
depositions.69 Delay tactics during the claims settlement process and during
stating that the insurance company “will pay no more than actual cash value of the damage
until actual repair or replacement is complete.” Id. at 188.
66. Press Release, Miss. Att’y Gen. Jim Hood, Statement on Ruling to Remand Insurance
Lawsuit (Dec. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Insurance Lawsuit Press Release], available at http://
www.ago.state.ms.us/index.php/press/releases/statement_on_ruling_to_remand_insurance_
lawsuit/.
67. Id.
68. Katrina Case Press Release, supra note 54.
69. State Farm was recently sanctioned and held in contempt by an Oklahoma judge for
discovery abuses, including failing to comply with a court order and refusing to answer
questions during depositions. Order Sustaining Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt and for
Sanctions Against Defendant, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, Watkins v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., No. CJ-2000-303 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 25, 2006), appeal docketed, No. DF103756 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 13, 2006), appeal dismissed per stipulation, verdict vacated
and confidential settlement entered, No. DF-103756 (Jan. 12, 2007). The court found that
State Farm’s obstructionist behavior willful, deliberate, and in bad faith and ordered State
Farm to immediately produce the documents, respond to interrogatories, re-produce several
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litigation allow insurance companies to earn substantial interest on large sums
of money which rightfully belong to policyholders.70
Although earning interest on business assets is not illegal, it becomes
problematic when insurance companies engage in delay tactics at the expense
of policyholders. The Oklahoma Insurance Code provides that the failure to
make a good faith effort to promptly settle claims when liability has become
reasonably clear constitutes an unfair claim settlement practice.71 By
intentionally engaging in delay tactics, insurance companies have violated their
duty to deal fairly and act in good faith, thereby committing first party bad
faith.72 Nevertheless, insurance companies continue to use techniques to delay
payment of policyholders’ claims because the benefits of the earned interest
outweigh the repercussions for engaging in such practices. Therefore, insurance
companies have no incentive to promptly satisfy policyholders’ claims until the
punishment for delay tactics sufficiently affects insurance companies’ costbenefit analysis and delay tactics are no longer deemed financially viable.
3. Settle on the Spot: The Policy of Underpayment
The Oklahoma Insurance Code provides that an insurance company engages
in unfair claim settlement practices when the company does not attempt “in
good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims
submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear.”73 After major
catastrophes, insurance companies often encourage claim adjusters to “settle on
the spot.”74 At first glance, settling on the spot seems favorable to policyholders
because it provides immediate monetary relief, but the practice raises questions
of fairness. Although insurance companies recognize policyholders’ urgent
deponents, and pay the costs and attorney’s fees associated with the violations. Id. In
addition, the court adopted a proposed jury instruction, pursuant to 12 OKLA. STAT. §
3237(B)(2)(a) (2001), advising the jury that State Farm had been found guilty of litigation
misconduct “in obstructing or refusing to answer appropriate deposition questions” and
allowed the jury to presume the answers would have been detrimental to State Farm’s
interests. Id. The order, however, was later rescinded, although the judge noted he may
require further hearings on the matter or reissue the order without prior notice. Order
Sustaining Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt and for Sanctions Against Defendant, State Farm
Fire & Casualty Company, Watkins, No. CJ-2000-303.
70. The year of the May 3, 1999, tornados, withholding replacement cost coverage owed
to policyholders—referred to as “holdback”—allowed State Farm to retain $10 million in the
Oklahoma and Kansas region alone. Trial Transcript at 27, Watkins, No. CJ-2000-303.
Nationally, State Farm retained $104 million in holdback. Id.
71. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(4).
72. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 149 (8th ed. 2004).
73. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(4) (emphasis added).
74. STATE FARM FIRE & CAS. CO., FIRE ASSIST TRAINING/CLAIM SERVICE STUDENT’S
MANUAL: TRICKS OF THE TRADE 19 (1996).
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need to restore their homes to a liveable condition after a catastrophe, the
insurance companies’ anxiousness to settle claims preys upon the policyholders’
vulnerabilities and presents the opportunity for insurance companies to
underpay claims. For example, State Farm’s Claim Service Student’s Manual
instructs claim representatives about “tricks of the trade” for handling
catastrophe claims and encourages claims representatives to “negotiate
settlements.”75 Furthermore, the manual states that “it is not necessary to tell
a policyholder your experience level or give them the impression you are
unfamiliar [with] the Fire Company adjusting practices.”76 Certainly, these
“tricks of the trade” should qualify as unfair settlement practices under the
Oklahoma Insurance Code. By implementing a policy of settling claims so soon
after catastrophes, insurance companies engage in bad faith by disregarding
their duties of good faith and fair dealing and failing to make a good faith effort
to properly settle policyholders’ claims.
In addition, settling claims “on the spot” decreases a policyholder’s
likelihood of receiving all of the benefits the policy affords the policyholder. By
settling claims quickly, insurers avoid paying additional benefits, such as
additional living expenses77 and overhead and profit.78 Often, policyholders are
unaware of their entitlement to these benefits or are uncertain about the
procedure for obtaining such benefits.79 Immediate settlement without full
disclosure of policy benefits is unfair. If policyholders knew that the policy
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Additional living expenses (ALE) is a benefit that provides additional coverage when
an insured requires temporary shelter because the dwelling is rendered temporarily
uninhabitable. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 6 (search “Glossary” for the term “additional living
expense”).
78. Overhead and profit is a benefit available to policyholders that provides an additional
twenty percent above the amount of the claim to pay for a general contractor to coordinate
repairs. Gilderman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 941, 943 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). A
Pennsylvania court held that general contractor overhead and profit is included in the actual
cash value payment. Id. Therefore, the insurance company cannot withhold overhead and
profit as part of the holdback under a two-step process for paying replacement cost benefits.
Id. According to the Gilderman court’s decision, policyholders are entitled to overhead and
profit whether they actually hire a general contractor or coordinate the repairs themselves. See
id.
79. Steve Strezelec, a former employee of State Farm who now testifies as an expert
witness on behalf of policyholders, testified that general contractor overhead and profit was
often not clearly explained and was frequently concealed from policyholders. Trial Transcript,
supra note 70, at 2304. Strezelec testified that State Farm retained a lot of money as a result
of State Farm’s concealing and failing to explain overhead and profit. Id. In addition, class
members testified they were unaware of their entitlement to general contractor overhead and
profit. Id. at 1258.
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provided additional living expenses for temporary shelter until the home
returned to livable conditions, the urgency of recovering the insurance claim
would be reduced, allowing the policyholder, as well as the insurance company,
to fully evaluate the claim.
In some circumstances, insurance companies have faced criminal charges for
rapidly settling claims without fully disclosing policy benefits to policyholders.80
Because of the underpayment that occurred in Mississippi following Hurricane
Katrina, Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood has criminally charged five
insurance companies with persuading victims of Hurricane Katrina to sign
forms acknowledging that they sustained flood damage—damage not covered
by the victims’ policies—in order to receive an immediate payment for living
expenses.81
Similarly, insurance companies withhold overhead and profit by settling
claims quickly after catastrophes. Although insurance companies previously
required policyholders to show a specified number of trades were necessary to
repair the damaged property before policyholders could recover overhead and
profit, it is now within the discretion of the insurance company to determine
whether overhead and profit is reasonable and necessary.82 Policyholders who
settle too quickly following a catastrophe are more likely to be denied this
benefit. When policyholders are aware of the procedure for obtaining overhead
and profit benefits, they will likely be more hesitant to settle their claims before
obtaining sufficient information to show general contractor overhead and profit
is a reasonable and necessary expense.
Failing to fully disclose all of the benefits and coverage available under an
insurance policy when such benefits and coverage are pertinent to the claim
violates Oklahoma’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.83 An insurance
80. Miss. AG Accuses Five Carriers of Attempting to Cheat Katrina Survivors, INS. J.,
Sept. 15, 2005, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2005/09/15/59672.htm
[hereinafter Miss. AG Accuses].
81. Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood has criminally charged insurance
companies—including Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,
Allstate Property and Casualty Co., and United Services Automobile Association—for
attempting to cheat Hurricane Katrina survivors out of millions of dollars regarding their
homeowners insurance claims. Id. However, Hood has expressed willingness to drop the
criminal investigation against State Farm in the event of an agreeable settlement with
policyholders. Anita Lee, Damaging Opinions: Attorney Claims Consultants’ Findings
Convenient for Insurance Companies, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), July 30, 2006, at A1.
82. State Farm’s expert witness, a former employee at the Oklahoma Department of
Insurance in the claims division, testified that the insurance company determines whether it
is reasonable and necessary to pay general contractor overhead and profit. Trial Transcript,
supra note 70, at 3589, 3663.
83. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(1) (2001).
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company that attempts to settle claims quickly in order to avoid disclosing the
range of benefits available under the policy engages in bad faith by failing to
comply with the duties of good faith and fair dealing. Quick settlement of
claims is desirable to both the policyholder and the insurance company so long
as integrity and fairness do not suffer as a result. Nevertheless, fairness and
integrity suffer when insurance companies take advantage of policyholders’
vulnerabilities following a catastrophe in an effort to underpay claims.
4. Programs Implemented to Facilitate Bad Faith Payment of Claims
Insurance companies, like other major corporations, often hire third-party
consulting firms to analyze components of their business and recommend
policies and procedures to benefit the company.84 Unfortunately, several
insurance companies, including State Farm, USAA, Allstate, and Nationwide,
have used recommendations from consulting firms to implement wrongful
claims practices and profit-making schemes specifically designed to underpay
policyholders; thereby limiting their losses during catastrophes.85
For example, State Farm hired McKinsey & Company to develop a corporate
methodology to improve company profits by reducing indemnity payout on
claims;86 the resulting program was known as ACE. Upon recognizing the
program’s incredible potential for cost savings in claims handling,87 several
other insurance companies adopted variations of ACE.88
Through
84. Hager v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 98-CI-2482, 2002 WL 34360512 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 25,
2002).
85. Watkins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CJ-2000-303 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 25,
2006), appeal docketed, No. DF-103756 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 13, 2006), appeal dismissed
per stipulation, verdict vacated and confidential settlement entered, No. DF-103756 (Jan. 12,
2007); see also H.R. 60-ESSB 5726, 2007 Reg. Sess., at 4 (Wash. 2007), available at http://
apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/5726-S.HBR.pdf
(noting that insurance companies are hiring consulting firms to depress claims payments).
86. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 2365-66.
87. An internal State Farm publication referred to ACE as “an extraordinary example of
changing the way we operate to save really significant costs.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
A Stitch in Time, Costs Saving Solutions for the 90’s, ACTION, Jan. 1996 (on file with the
author). State Farm’s Senior Vice President stated, “ACE has the potential of taking a billion
dollars of cost out of our system every year!” Id. “At State Farm the ratio [of claims paid to
premiums collected since ACE was implemented] dropped from 77.5% in 1994 to 66.6% in
2005 . . . .” Walter Updegrave & Kate Ashford, Think You’re Insured? Maybe Not., MONEY,
Mar. 2007, at 110, available at http://money.aol.com/cnnmoney/insurance/canvas3/_a/
insurance-coverageclaim-disputes/20070308143809990002.
88. Through McKinsey & Company’s recommendations, State Farm and Nationwide
implemented programs called “Advancing Claims Excellence” (ACE), USAA implemented
“Professionalism and Claims Excellence” (PACE), and Allstate implemented “Claim Core
Process Redesign” (CCPR). See The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Antitrust Immunity: Good
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implementation of ACE, State Farm developed incentives, such as promotions
for keeping costs down, that resulted in policyholders being paid less than they
were owed.89 According to a former State Farm employee, ACE created
pressure for profit-making that manifested itself in underpayment of claims.90
State Farm alleges the purpose of ACE was to identify and remove
shortfall—the difference between the amount paid on a claim and the amount
State Farm thought should have been paid—by conducting closed file reviews.91
State Farm documents, however, revealed that State Farm had evidence during
the development of ACE that it would result in underpaying policyholders’
claims. 92 In addition, a State Farm internal memorandum regarding a focus
group analysis of ACE revealed that State Farm knew ACE was “nothing more
than a program for increased profits.”93 The memorandum recounts the focus
group’s comments in response to ACE, stating that State Farm “is involved in
a national conspiracy to cheat policyholders out of money that they are entitled
to,” and State Farm “prey[s] on the poor, elderly, uneducated, and non-English
speaking policyholders.”94
Implementing a company-wide scheme to adopt methods for reducing
indemnity payments owed to policyholders is illegal under Oklahoma law.95
The Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act provides that an insurer’s failure
to make a good faith attempt “to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement
of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear” constitutes
an unfair claim settlement practice.96 By disregarding their duties of good faith
and fair dealing, insurance companies have committed bad faith through the
implementation of corporate schemes designed to reduce indemnity payments
to policyholders.

for Consumers?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 66 (2007)
(prepared statement of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer Federation of
America), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate
_hearings&docid=f:35166.pdf.
89. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 2363, 2295-97 (discussing claim representatives’
salary being determined on how well shortfall is reduced and noting that claim representatives’
financial future is being driven on reducing shortfall).
90. Id. at 2394.
91. Id. at 136-37.
92. Id. at 2366.
93. Memorandum from Frank Comella, Watkins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CJ2000-303 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 25, 2006), appeal docketed, No. DF-103756 (Okla. Civ. App.
Sept. 13, 2006), appeal dismissed per stipulation, verdict vacated and confidential settlement
entered, No. DF-103756 (Jan. 12, 2007).
94. Id.
95. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(4) (2001).
96. Id.
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B. Fraud
An insurance company commits fraud when it knowingly misrepresents or
conceals a material fact to induce a policyholder to act to his or her detriment.97
To meet the prima facie elements of fraud, the plaintiff must show: (1) there
was a false material misrepresentation; (2) which was either known to be false
or made recklessly without knowledge of the truth; (3) with the intention that it
be acted upon; and (4) which was detrimentally relied upon.98 Insurance
companies have been held liable for committing fraudulent claims handling
practices in Oklahoma, as well as on the Gulf Coast, for hiring biased
engineering firms to produce predetermined reports against the interest of
policyholders and hiring ill-trained independent adjusters and falsely
representing that the adjusters are employees of the insurance company.99
1. Biased Engineering Firms Producing Outcome-Oriented Reports
Often, insurance companies rely on reports produced by professional
engineers who survey the damaged property to determine the insurance
companies’ liability for claims.100 Following a catastrophe, insurance
companies hire structural engineering firms to assess the damage in the affected
area and determine the extent to which the natural disaster directly caused the
damage.101 In recent years, courts have found insurance companies to have
acted fraudulently by hiring biased engineering firms to produce outcomeoriented reports.102 In Watkins v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., an
Oklahoma jury unanimously found that State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
(State Farm) hired Haag Engineering, a Texas structural engineering firm, to
survey damage in Oklahoma and produce biased reports in favor of State Farm
following the May 3, 1999, tornados.103 The jury found that Haag Engineering
surveyed the damage in Oklahoma with a pretextual basis for denying claims
and wrote “cookie cutter” reports concluding that the tornados produced no
structural damage. 104 Instead, the reports concluded that poor construction

97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (8th ed. 2004).
98. Gay v. Akin, 1988 OK 150, ¶ 7, 766 P.2d 985, 989.
99. Opinion on Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Broussard v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV6 LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 113942 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 11, 2007);
Watkins, No. CJ-2000-303; see also Tom Wilemon, State Farm Critics Not Surprised by
Today’s Ruling, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Jan. 11, 2007, at A1.
100. See Case Preparation, supra note 55.
101. Id.
102. Watkins, No. CJ-2000-303; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 963 S.W.2d 42,
45 (Tex. 1998); State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex. 1997).
103. Watkins, No. CJ-2000-303.
104. Id.
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caused the cracked foundations and moving bricks.105 Because the jury found
State Farm’s conduct willful and malicious, the jury awarded the plaintiffs
actual and punitive damages.106
In a previous Texas case, the Texas Supreme Court held State Farm liable
for hiring a biased engineering firm—again, Haag Engineering—to evaluate a
homeowner’s claim regarding a plumbing leak.107 The court held that reliance
on an expert report did not shield an insurer from fraud and bad faith liability
if the plaintiff presents evidence that the report was not prepared objectively.108
The well-settled law in Texas is that an insurance company cannot “insulate
itself from bad faith liability by investigating a claim in a manner calculated to
construct a pretextual basis for denial.”109 Even after the Texas Supreme
Court’s ruling that State Farm’s use of Haag Engineering was fraudulent and
bad faith conduct, State Farm nevertheless subsequently used Haag Engineering
in Oklahoma.110 The unanimous verdict in Watkins against State Farm
regarding its use of Haag Engineering was Oklahoma’s first opportunity to
examine insurance companies use of biased engineering firms to adjust
claims.111
Even though Oklahoma and Texas courts held State Farm liable for hiring
Haag Engineering as a biased engineering firm, State Farm again contracted
with Haag Engineering to survey damage on the Gulf Coast following
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.112 In addition to the numerous civil suits that have
been filed against insurers for fraudulently using biased engineers following
Katrina,113 the Mississippi Attorney General has instituted a criminal
investigation as well.114 The Mississippi Attorney General has looked to the
Watkins case and its unanimous verdict regarding State Farm’s conduct in
Oklahoma to facilitate the investigation.115 Insurers’ use of biased engineering
105. Id.
106. Verdict Form at 1, Watkins, No. CJ-2000-303.
107. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d at 448.
108. Id. (citing Lyons v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. of Tex., 866 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tex. 1993)).
109. Douglas v. State Farm Lloyds, 37 F. Supp. 2d 532, 541 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (citing State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 963 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Tex. 1998); Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d at
448; Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 601).
110. Watkins, No. CJ-2000-303.
111. Id.
112. 700 Katrina Victims Sue Insurance Firm, USA TODAY, May 10, 2006, at 3A
[hereinafter 700 Katrina Victims Sue].
113. During the Oklahoma trial, almost 700 Gulf Coast homeowners filed suit against State
Farm for using “a biased, ‘one-size-fits-all’ engineering report as the basis for denying claims
from Hurricane Katrina.” Id. The report, produced by Haag Engineering, concluded that the
storm surge, rather than the wind, caused the homeowners’ damage. Id.
114. Miss. AG Accuses, supra note 80.
115. A federal grand jury in Mississippi subpoenaed a transcript from Watkins,
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companies will rise to the level of criminal fraud if the misrepresentations are
determined to be willful.116 In support of the Mississippi Attorney General’s
theory that the misrepresentations were willful, two whistleblowers have come
forward to report that an insurance company “pressured engineers to change
conclusions so claims could be denied” following Hurricane Katrina.117 The
whistleblowers also reported that if the insurance company did not like the
reports submitted, the insurance company pressured the engineer to alter the
reports’ conclusions or risk nonpayment and the loss of future business.118
Engineering reports in the Gulf Coast played a critical role in determining
whether Katrina victims’ claims were to be paid by their insurer or by the
National Flood Insurance Program—if the policyholder was to be paid at all.
That determination depended upon whether Hurricane Katrina’s wind or water
caused the property damage.119 If the engineering report determined that the
storm surge and its resulting flooding caused the damage, the insurance
company was not liable, as most policies do not insure against flood damage.120
As a result of insurance companies falsely blaming property damage on water
rather than wind, the National Flood Insurance Program was forced to pay for
much of Hurricane Katrina’s damage.121 Numerous Katrina victims have
brought suit against insurance companies claiming that Haag Engineering’s
reports erroneously indicated that flooding caused damage to their property.122
The victims allege that the insurance companies, specifically Nationwide
Insurance Company and State Farm, purchased reports from Haag Engineering
that concluded Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge preceded the wind for the

policyholders’ claim files, Haag Engineering reports, and the sworn testimony of twenty-six
individuals that range from top executives to claims adjusters. Lee, supra note 16, at A1.
Currently, the criminal investigation is being used as leverage to facilitate settlement of civil
suits of policyholders in Mississippi and elsewhere. Lee, supra note 81, at A1.
116. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (8th ed. 2004).
117. Michael Kunzelman, Lawyer: Whistleblower Helping Build Case Against Insurer in
Hurricane Katrina Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, Mar. 17, 2006, available at
Westlaw, 3/17/06 AP Worldstream 04:55:11.
118. Id.
119. A manual, created by Tim Marshall, Professional Engineer and meteorologist for Haag
Engineering Co., was provided to Nationwide Insurance Co. to help them determine if damage
was caused by wind or wave. TIM MARSHALL, WIND OR WAVE: AN EXERCISE IN DAMAGE
ANALYSIS (2005).
120. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 186 (providing an ISO sample policy excluding water
damage, defined as “[f]lood, surface water, waves, tidal water, overflow of a body of water,
or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind”).
121. Opinion on Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Broussard v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV6 LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 113942 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 11, 2007).
122. 700 Katrina Victims Sue, supra note 112.
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purpose of denying policyholders’ claims.123 Policyholders allege the insurance
companies committed fraud by hiring Haag Engineering to make false
representations about the cause of their damaged property, knowing that the
reports were false, and relying on the reports to the detriment of
policyholders.124 Relying on and encouraging clearly objectionable reports
constitutes fraud and violates the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.125 To
change this fraudulent behavior, courts must inflict a punishment sufficiently
harsh to outweigh the millions of dollars insurance companies save by engaging
in fraudulent conduct.
2. Independent Adjusters Participating in a Masquerade
In addition to insurance companies commission of fraud through hiring
biased engineering companies as a pretextual basis for denying policyholders’
claims, insurance companies further commit fraud by hiring independent
adjusters and misrepresenting them to be employees of the insurance
company.126 Insurance companies use independent adjusters to create a layer
of insulation between themselves and the insured designed to shield the
companies from bad faith liability.127 Although the use of independent adjusters
is permissible, a problem arises when the insurance company masquerades
independent adjusters as employees of the insurance company.128 For example,
123. Lee, supra note 81, at A1; Lee, supra note 16, at A1.
124. The CEO and Chairman of State Farm, Edward B. Rust, Jr., testified during a
deposition in the Watkins case regarding the Oklahoma May 3, 1999, tornados that if State
Farm had it to do over again, State Farm would not have used Haag Engineering to assess
Hurricane Katrina damage. Anita Lee, State Farm to Probe Haag Firm: Policyholders’
Lawyer Calls It Just a Spin Tactic, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Sept. 21, 2006, at A1. Rust
also discussed an independent investigation, conducted by a team of State Farm employees and
outside legal counsel, regarding State Farm’s use of Haag Engineering and stated that a
moratorium had been placed on State Farm’s use of Haag Engineering as a result of the
Oklahoma jury’s findings in Watkins. Id. Although Rust testified that he did not consider
State Farm’s use of biased engineers to represent a pattern, he acknowledged the Texas
Supreme Court’s decision, as well as similar findings in a medical malpractice case by an
Idaho court. Id. (discussing a 1998 Idaho case where the judge found that State Farm,
“beginning with its claims adjuster and running up through its management, participated in
the egregious process of manufacturing fictitious reports and obtaining biased opinions”).
125. An insurance company’s failure to adopt and implement reasonable standards of
investigation constitutes an unfair claim settlement practice. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(3)
(2001).
126. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 7.
127. Id. at 37.
128. Plaintiff’s expert witness, a former employee of State Farm, testified that it was
appropriate for State Farm to use independent adjusters following the catastrophe. Id. at 2306.
The witness stated that State Farm erred, however, by not identifying the adjusters as
independents, noting that an independent adjuster’s training does not compare to the training
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an Oklahoma court has held State Farm liable for willfully and maliciously
hiring independent adjusters and masquerading the independent adjusters as
State Farm employees.129 Following the May 3, 1999, tornados in Oklahoma,
State Farm hired independent adjusters and provided them with State Farm
shirts, badges, and stickers for their cars.130 State Farm then dispatched these
independent adjusters to adjust claims on behalf of State Farm, instructing the
adjusters not to inform policyholders about their independent status.131 At trial,
State Farm justified this nondisclosure as a means of protecting policyholders
by stating that the policyholders did not need any additional worries in the midst
of the catastrophe.132
Although the use of independent adjusters is permissible during a state of
emergency, disguising independent adjusters as employees of the insurance
company and misrepresenting their qualifications constitutes fraud.133
Insurance companies make a material misrepresentation by giving independent
adjusters the appearance of employees of the insurance company134 and
instructing the independent adjusters not to inform policyholders of their status
nor their qualifications.135 Insurance companies knowingly make these false
representations because the companies are responsible for hiring the
independent adjusters and have documentation stating independents are not as
well qualified as adjusters employed by the insurance companies.136 In addition,
insurance companies hire independent adjusters for the purpose, and with the
intention, of acting upon the adjusters’ determinations. Policyholders, unaware
of the adjusters’ independent status and training level, detrimentally rely upon

of a State Farm employee. Id.
129. Verdict Form, supra note 106, at 1.
130. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 75 (discussing independent adjusters that were
issued State Farm credentials and received State Farm jackets, shirts, and signs in the
aftermath of the May 3, 1999, Oklahoma tornados. State Farm adjusters and independent
adjusters had the same duties and authority to pay claims).
131. Id. at 76 (discussing State Farm advising independent adjusters not to disclose their
status as independent adjusters unless asked by the policyholder).
132. Id.
133. State Farm’s expert witness, a former employee of the Oklahoma Insurance
Department, testified that the Insurance Commissioner must declare a state of emergency
before independent adjusters can be used. Id. at 3616. The witness further testified that the
Insurance Commissioner has jurisdiction over complaints regarding independent adjusters.
Id. at 3593. Of the eighty independent adjusters hired by State Farm in the aftermath of the
May 3, 1999, tornados, twenty-five were involved in complaints. Id. at 3672.
134. Id. at 75.
135. Id. at 76.
136. Id. at 3711 (discussing State Farm internal documents noting that independent
adjusters are less qualified than State Farm adjusters).
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the determinations of the independent adjusters. The policyholders’ detriment
results from independent adjusters’ incentive to underpay claims.
Insurance companies create an environment that encourages independent
adjusters to underpay claims while contractually shielding themselves from bad
faith liability. 137 By tracking the average amount paid on claims for each
adjuster, insurance companies are able to determine which adjusters are keeping
costs down.138 Independent adjusters are therefore rewarded by receiving
additional business by minimizing the insurance company’s indemnity payout
on claims. Although claims adjusters are intended to be neutral, disinterested
third parties, this policy of tracking adjusters’ payout has resulted in conflicting
interests between independent adjusters and policyholders by incentivizing
independent adjusters to underpay and deny claims.139 Two former independent
adjusters, hired to adjust claims in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, testified
before a grand jury that they were hired by the insurance company to defraud
policyholders by denying claims.140 The adjusters testified that they refused to
cover at least two billion dollars in damages caused by Hurricane Katrina.141
Insurance companies have engaged in fraudulent claims handling practices by
creating an environment that fosters underpayment of claims through the use of
independent adjusters, misrepresenting the independent status of the adjusters
to policyholders, and allowing policyholders to detrimentally rely on the
independent adjusters’ determinations.
IV. Shifting the Risk to Policyholders, the Government, and Reinsurance
Companies
Insurers often develop methods, beyond hiring biased engineers and
independent adjusters, to insulate themselves from the extreme financial
consequences of catastrophes by adopting risk-limiting strategies. Insurance
companies are reducing financial exposure by shifting much of the risk
associated with insurance to policyholders, the government, and reinsurance
companies. Insurance companies are implementing strategies that require
policyholders in disaster-prone areas like Oklahoma to bear much more of the
risk of potential catastrophic loss.142 Increasingly, major insurers attempt to
avoid high catastrophe areas by refusing to issue new policies143 and refusing
137. Id. at 37.
138. Id. at 2297-98.
139. Id.
140. Kunzelman, supra note 42, at E3.
141. Id.
142. See Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 2 (showing that Oklahoma ranked among the top ten
states in total catastrophe losses for 2007).
143. Gosselin, supra note 11, at A18 (reporting that major insurance companies, such as
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to renew existing policies in these areas.144 In addition, insurers reduce
coverage in these areas by diluting the terms and conditions of the policies to
limit the insurance company’s risk.145 The state and federal governments must
also bear much of the risk insurance companies have escaped,146 as major
insurance companies have lobbied successfully for the creation of state and
federal catastrophe funds to serve as a limit on the insurance companies’
liability for catastrophic losses.147 Also, insurance companies are reducing their
presence in the most risky lines of business, such as flood insurance, due to the
federal government’s increased responsibility with respect to these areas of
insurance.148 George K. Bernstein, the first administrator of the government’s
flood, riot, and crime insurance programs, warned, “[t]here’s not going to be
much left that [the insurance companies] do insure by the time it’s all over.”149
Unfortunately, if the insurance companies continue to shift the assumption of
risk to the government, Bernstein’s statement will come to fruition. Insurers
further insulate themselves by purchasing reinsurance policies.150 Although
reinsurance provides much needed protection to insurers, reinsurance allows
insurers to become overly insulated from liability and overextend themselves in
the number of policies issued. The added protection provided by reinsurance
allows insurers to engage in risky business ventures that may prove detrimental
to policyholders.

Allstate, are “approving no new policies along substantial stretches of the nation’s East and
Gulf coasts”); Aldo Svaldi, Federal Backup Sought to Pay Claims: Insurance Pool Pushed
Again—Some Argue that Those Living in Low-Risk Areas Shouldn’t Have to Fund Catastrophe
Coverage, DENVER POST, Jan. 8, 2006, at K1 (reporting that Allstate is looking to do business
in “safer” states like Colorado).
144. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 2144 (discussing an insured that was not renewed
due to difficulty in claims settlement; noting that non-renewal will stand as an underwriting
decision).
145. Gosselin, supra note 11, at A18.
146. Id.
147. Herrndobler, supra note 14, at E1.
148. Gosselin, supra note 11, at A18.
149. Id.
150. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss1/4

2008]

COMMENT

213

A. Shifting the Risk to Policyholders
California’s Insurance Commissioner described the insurance industry as
“running away from risk, and leaving policyholders holding the bag.”151 By
running away, insurance companies defeat policyholders’ purpose in purchasing
insurance. Homeowners acquire insurance to mitigate the potentially
devastating financial consequences of a natural catastrophe or other significant
loss.152 The policyholder assumes that by making regular premium payments
to the insurance company, the policyholder will not be faced with the cost of
rebuilding in the event of a major loss as the insurance company will cover the
cost of rebuilding. Because insurers have shifted so much of the risk to
policyholders, policyholders now bear the burden of their regular premiums and
the risk of great financial loss in the event of a catastrophe. Insurance
companies have shifted the risk to policyholders by increasing premiums,
increasing deductibles, reducing coverage, refusing to issue policies in high risk
areas, and refusing to renew high risk policyholders.153
Homeowners insurance premiums continue to rise.154 By increasing
premiums, insurance companies decrease the amount of each premium dollar
spent on claims and expenses, known as the combined ratio.155 A lowered
combined ratio equates to less risk for the insurer.156 Insurers, however, provide
an alternate explanation for rising premiums. Insurers claim that the deficit
they experienced after the devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons
necessitates the increase in premiums.157 For example, insurance companies
have added an annual 1% charge to Florida citizens’ premiums.158 According
to the insurance companies, over the next ten years this annual increase will pay
off $1.5 billion in deficits that resulted from the 2004 and 2005 storm losses.159
The insurance companies’ deficit claim, however, is difficult to reconcile with
151. Id.
152. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 3 (stating that “the function of insurance is to protect the
policyholder in the event of a future loss”).
153. Gosselin, supra note 11, at A18.
154. Id. (stating that premiums for homeowners insurance have increased over fifty percent
since the early 1990s).
155. The combined ratio is the percentage of each premium dollar that the insurance
company spends on claims and expenses. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 6 (search “Glossary” for
the term “combined ratio”). When the combined ratio decreases, it means financial results for
the insurnace company are improving. Id.
156. Id.
157. Gosselin, supra note 11, at A18.
158. Paul Flemming, Cabinet Oks 1 Percent Insurance Charge: Add-on to Pay Bonds for
Catastrophe Fund, NEWS-PRESS (Fort Myers, Fla.), June 1, 2006, at B5.
159. Id.
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the insurance industry’s record profits in 2004 and 2005.160 Following
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, insurance premiums in the Gulf Coast
rose as much as 500%. 161 This sky-rocketing increase may force many Gulf
Coast residents to relocate.162
While some insurers in catastrophe-prone areas increase premiums, others
exit the market entirely.163 For example, Allstate Insurance Company has
announced that it will no longer issue new homeowners policies for homes
located along the East and Gulf coasts.164 By exiting the market, insurance
companies shift all of the risk of loss to homeowners, thus making homeowners
unwilling, or unable, to continue residing near the coasts.165 Homeowners who
continue residing in areas where insurers have pulled out of the market will
either reside with no insurance, bearing one-hundred percent of the risk
associated with potential loss, or be forced to pay a colossal amount in
premiums due to the lack of market competition. In response to the shrinking
insurance market in some states, Colorado and other states have argued for the
creation of catastrophe funds on a state-by-state basis to prevent homeowners
living in low risk states like Colorado from paying higher premiums to
compensate for those living in high risk states like Oklahoma.166 A state-bystate scheme for catastrophe funds, as proposed by Colorado, could potentially
prevent the sky-rocketing increases in premiums that follow catastrophes like
Hurricane Katrina and prevent the repercussions of increases from spilling over
into other states.167
In addition, insurers increasingly refuse to renew policies in high risk areas
following a catastrophe.168 After the 1999 tornados near Oklahoma City, State

160. Gosselin, supra note 11, at A18.
161. Ramstack, supra note 3, at C12.
162. Thomas Lee, Counting the COST: Insurers Have Never Seen the Likes of Hurricane
Katrina, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Oct. 24, 2005, at 1D (suggesting insurance
premiums in Louisiana might become unaffordable for businesses and homeowners, thereby
forcing policyholders to consider relocation).
163. Svaldi, supra note 143, at K1.
164. Gosselin, supra note 11, at A18.
165. See Lee, supra note 162, at 1D.
166. Svaldi, supra note 143, at K1; see also Lee, supra note 162, at 1D (suggesting
insurance companies might seek to spread the risk of catastrophes to policyholders throughout
the country).
167. Svaldi, supra note 143, at K1.
168. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 2144; see also Anita Lee, State Farm Drops Wind
Coverage: New Customers Won’t Be Covered, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Dec. 16, 2006,
at A1 (discussing State Farm’s decision to no longer provide wind coverage for new
policyholders in Mississippi and State Farm’s considerations regarding whether to extend wind
coverage on renewals of existing policies).
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Farm denied renewal of policies held by homeowners in the area.169 State Farm
justified their refusal to renew the policies by claiming the policyholders were
difficult during the claims process.170 When an insurance company refuses to
renew a policy, policyholders must find an insurance company willing to insure
already damaged property—often at unnecessarily high premiums—or be left
with no coverage.
Insurers have also shifted the risk of loss to policyholders by reducing
coverage. The Insurance Information Institute reports that, historically,
insurers covered more than sixty percent of total losses caused by a natural
disaster.171 Following the 2004 hurricanes in Florida, however, insurers
covered less than fifty percent of the total losses caused by the hurricane.172
Coverage decreased even further in 2005, when insurers covered only thirty
percent of the total losses resulting from Hurricane Katrina.173 As the losses
covered by insurers decreases, the risk born by policyholders increases because
homeowners not only have to pay premiums for insurance, but are also
compelled to be financially responsible for an uncovered loss.
Insurers also reduce coverage by tightening policy language.174 For example,
insurance companies have relied on the intricacies of policy language to deny
post-Hurricane Katrina claims on the basis that wind damage is not covered
when water contributes to the damage. 175 Mississippi Attorney General Jim
Hood commented that, “sneaky companies have tried to use these provisions to
even deny wind damage if any water touched the house. This just shows how
overreaching the insurance industry has become in using their ‘fine print.’”176
Fortunately for policyholders, a U.S. district judge ruled that the language was
ambiguous and could not be enforced.177 Although insurers are increasingly
relying on the fine print of policy language to deny claims, courts are
recognizing the ambiguity and interpreting the policy against the drafter
consistent with the universal law of contracts.178
169. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 2144.
170. Id. (describing a policyholder whose homeowners policy was not renewed, after fortyfive years of being insured with State Farm, due to difficulty in the settlement of her claim;
policyholder testified she was not being difficult, but simply standing up for her rights).
171. Gosselin, supra note 11, A18.
172. Id.
173. Id. (noting that the low percentage is partially due to the large amount of flood
damage).
174. Id.
175. Anita Lee, Settlement Near?: State Farm May Reopen Claims, SUN HERALD (Biloxi,
Miss.), Jan. 9, 2007, at A1; see also supra Part III.A.1.
176. Insurance Lawsuit Press Release, supra note 66.
177. Lee, supra note 175, at A1.
178. Katrina Case Press Release, supra note 54.
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In addition to tightening policy language regarding the hotly contested water
damage provision, insurers have narrowed the definition of “replacement cost
coverage” to change the procedure for paying replacement cost benefits, thereby
denying full coverage to policyholders. Replacement cost coverage is intended
to be the best policy available to homeowners. The Insurance Information
Institute defines replacement cost coverage as “[i]nsurance that pays the dollar
amount needed to replace . . . personal . . . or dwelling property without
deducting for depreciation.”179 Insurance companies, however, have tightened
the language in their policies to restrict coverage to the actual cash value.180
Actual cash value represents the replacement cost value of the damaged
property less the damaged property’s depreciation value.181 Only after the
policyholder provides documentation that the property has actually been
repaired or replaced will the insurance company pay the difference.182 This
two-step process for paying replacement cost coverage claims greatly reduces
coverage because policyholders often do not possess the money, time, or energy
to repair or replace damaged property after a natural disaster.
In addition, insurance companies impose time limitations within which
policyholders must claim their replacement cost benefits after the insurance
companies make the actual cash value payment for the policyholder’s damaged
property.183 The money that the insurance companies retains—the difference
between the replacement cost and the actual cash value—is referred to as
“holdback benefits.”184 Holdback benefits are money owed to the policyholders
but held back by the insurance company until the policyholder meets certain
conditions.185 Because many policyholders do not understand the replacement
cost provision of the policy, insurance companies retain millions of dollars
nationwide in holdback benefits.186
179. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 6 (search “Glossary” for the term “replacement cost”).
180. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 188.
181. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 6 (search “Glossary” for the term “actual cash value”).
182. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 188 (providing an ISO sample policy containing a
replacement cost provision stating that the insurance company will pay the cost to repair or
replace the property once actual repair or replacement is complete).
183. Id. (describing a provision in the ISO sample policy informing policyholders that if
they accept actual cash value at the time of loss, they must inform the insurance company of
their intent to make a claim for additional replacement cost benefits within 180 days of the
date of loss).
184. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 472 (describing the process of holding back
replacement cost benefits until actual repair or replacement is complete. The witness testified
that if the policyholder cannot afford to get the property repaired or replaced, the insurance
company keeps the benefits that were held back).
185. Id.
186. Following the May 3, 1999, tornados, State Farm retained $10 million in holdback
benefits never paid to policyholders in Oklahoma and Kansas through the two-step caveat in
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Insurers are aware that policyholders do not understand the procedure for
obtaining replacement cost benefits when they purchase policies.187 The most
frequently asked question by policyholders following a catastrophe is, “My
agent told me my policy provided replacement cost coverage for my house.
Why was I not paid the full cost to repair the damage to my home?”188
Policyholders do not understand the procedure for obtaining replacement cost
benefits because most insurance companies do not explain the two-step process
in their marketing materials, nor do the agents explain the procedure when
selling the policy.189 Because insurers know the two-step process is confusing
to policyholders and expensive for the insurance company to implement, some
insurers, such as State Farm, have considered switching to a one-step
process.190 Nevertheless, realizing the increase in claims expenditures that
resulted from paying policyholders the full amount owed on claims, State Farm
decided to return to a two-step process, claiming it was necessary to remain
competitive.191 Even though the insurance industry has toggled between a onestep process for paying replacement cost benefits outright and a two-step
process of holding back replacement cost benefits, the marketing materials used
by insurance companies regarding the replacement cost policies have not
changed.192
Some courts have held that replacement cost provisions that limit the
insurer’s liability to actual cash value unless the policyholder repairs or replaces
the property are void as unconscionable.193 In Pennsylvania, one such provision
the replacement cost provision of the policies. Id. at 27. Furthermore, State Farm retained
$104 million nationwide throughout that year. Id. at 10.
187. See STATE FARM INS. CO., FIRE ASSIST TRAINING/CLAIM SERVICE STUDENT’S
MANUAL: TEN QUESTIONS MOST COMMONLY ASKED ABOUT CATASTROPHE CLAIMS 13 (1996).
188. Id.
189. A State Farm employee testified that there is nothing in State Farm’s marketing
materials that informs a lay person how replacement cost benefits are paid, specifically, that
replacement cost benefits are not going to be paid until the policyholder makes the repairs
themselves. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 43, 436, 3706. In addition, State Farm’s
expert witness, a former employee of the Department of Insurance, testified that although State
Farm changed the process for paying replacement cost benefits, marketing materials remained
the same. Id. at 3706. Fraudulent marketing was one of the several claims brought against
State Farm in the aftermath of the 1999 tornados. See Amended Complaint, supra note 41.
190. See BISHOP & SPEIGHT, supra note 62, at 2 (stating in an internal State Farm study that
“the purpose of this research was to examine what effect a change in policy language and
claims settlement procedures regarding up-front payment of Coverage A—Replacement Cost
Benefits would have on overall claim severity, production efficiency, expense savings, and
customer service”).
191. Trial Transcript, supra note 70, at 472-73.
192. Id. at 3706.
193. Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding
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violated public policy because it required the insured to “procure from their own
funds, which they may not have, replacement property prior to receipt of full
replacement cost.”194 Although Oklahoma courts initially appeared to accept
this position as well,195 Oklahoma courts have since rejected the argument.196
In Bratcher v. State Farm, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the two-step
replacement cost provision was not void as unconscionable because the
provision was clear and unambiguous and, therefore, had to be given its plain
and ordinary meaning.197 Importantly, the court noted the plaintiff admitted that
he read and understood the policy, including the replacement cost provision.198
Because the plaintiff admittedly understood the replacement cost provision of
the policy, fraud was not a potential allegation.199 In addition, this admission
foreclosed the use of the doctrine of reasonable expectations—the avenue that
proved successful for plaintiff class members in Watkins regarding the
replacement cost provision.200
Although Oklahoma courts have declined to use the equitable doctrine of
unconscionability to hold replacement cost provisions void, plaintiffs in
Oklahoma may obtain relief under the doctrine of reasonable expectations.201
Under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, an ambiguous insurance policy
is to be resolved in favor of the insured’s expectations under the policy.202
Because insurers fail to explain the admittedly confusing two-step replacement
cost provision, policyholders expect insurance companies to pay the full cost of
replacing the policyholders’ property when that property is damaged.203 In
1996, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the doctrine of reasonable
the replacement requirement is unconscionable despite the clear and unambiguous language
of the policy).
194. Gilderman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 941, 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
195. Coblentz v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 1995 OK CIV APP 126, ¶ 10, 915 P.2d
938, 940 (holding the replacement requirement contained in a policy unconscionable),
overruled by Bratcher v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1998 OK 63, ¶ 10, 961 P.2d 828, 831.
196. Truesdell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 960 F. Supp. 1511, 1517 (N.D. Okla. 1997)
(holding that a replacement cost provision is not void as unconscionable in this instance);
Bratcher, ¶ 10, 961 P.2d at 831, overruling Coblentz, 1995 OK CIV APP 126, 915 P.2d 938.
197. Bratcher, ¶ 11, 961 P.2d at 831.
198. Id. ¶ 5, 961 P.2d at 830.
199. Id.
200. Watkins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CJ-2000-303 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 25,
2006), appeal docketed, No. DF-103756 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 13, 2006), appeal dismissed
per stipulation, verdict vacated and confidential settlement entered, No. DF-103756 (Jan. 12,
2007).
201. Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 1996 OK 28, ¶ 23, 912 P.2d 861,
870.
202. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1294 (8th ed. 2004).
203. See STATE FARM INS. CO., supra note 187, at 13.
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expectations applies to the interpretation of insurance contracts and can apply
to ambiguous language or to exclusions either masked by technical language or
hidden in the policy’s provisions. 204 The court stated, “[I]f the insurer or its
agent creates a reasonable expectation of coverage in the insured which is not
supported by policy language, the expectation will prevail over the language of
the policy.”205 Because insurers knowingly provide policyholders with the
expectation that the policyholder will receive the full replacement cost value of
damaged property, the insurance companies should be obligated to conform to
those expectations.206 When purchasing a replacement cost policy rather than
an actual cash value policy, policyholders have the reasonable expectation of
total coverage in the event of a loss, thereby justifying the higher premium.
Arguably, policyholders would not have spent the additional money to purchase
the replacement cost coverage if the policyholder knew that, upon a loss, the
coverage required the policyholders to spend his or her own money to repair or
replace their property before receiving the full benefits of the replacement cost
policy. To remedy the situation, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that
“reformation of an insurance contract is allowed if the insurer has reason to
believe that the insured would not have signed the contract if the inclusion of
certain limitations had been known.”207 Therefore, if the insurance company
has reason to believe that the policyholder would not have purchased
replacement cost coverage if he or she had known of the two-step provision,
then reformation of the policy would be allowed and the policyholder could
recover full replacement cost benefits.208
Oklahoma courts are increasingly making remedies available for
policyholders who have found themselves victims to the insurance industry’s
tactics to evade liability for claims. Insurance companies, nonetheless, continue
to avoid much of the risk necessarily associated with the insurance industry by
increasing premiums, diluting coverage, and pulling out of disaster prone
areas.209 Unfortunately, the remaining risks the insurance industry is unable to
push off on policyholders are often shifted to the government, leaving the
insurance industry in an increasingly safe and profitable position.210
B. Shifting the Risk to the Government

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Max True Plastering Co., ¶ 24, 912 P.2d at 870.
Id. ¶ 7, 912 P.2d at 864.
See STATE FARM INS. CO., supra note 187, at 13.
Max True Plastering Co., ¶ 14, 912 P.2d at 867.
Id.
Gosselin, supra note 11, at A18.
See id.
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Following the catastrophic years of 2004 and 2005, major insurers have
claimed that without government assistance insurance companies have little
incentive to provide coverage in high risk areas.211 Although the government
debates the insurance companies’ claim, especially in light of the insurance
companies’ extraordinary profits,212 the insurance companies threat of entirely
withdrawing from the market is concerning. As an alternative, insurance
companies are seeking assistance from the government in the most risky areas
of insurance, such as catastrophe coverage. To ensure insurance companies
remain in the market, the government is increasingly accepting many of the risks
associated with private insurance.213
For example, following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center,
Congress passed the 2002 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).214 In the
event of another major terrorist attack, TRIA will provide federal money to
assist private insurance companies by paying ninety percent of insured losses.215
TRIA provides up to $100 billion of federal assistance to insurance
companies.216 Under the original TRIA, damages from the terrorist attack had
to exceed $5 million before the federal government was obligated to
contribute.217 Although the trigger mark for damages increased to $50 million
in 2006, and will increase again in 2007, TRIA has nonetheless been criticized
as being a gift to the insurance industry.218 The government has expressed
reluctance to back terrorism coverage, but Congress nonetheless continues to
extend TRIA.219
Insurance companies are further shifting risks to the government by refusing
to cover risky lines of insurance, such as flood insurance.220 Federal money
211. Id.
212. Allstate’s CEO, Edward M. Liddy, described how a set of storms can wipe out an
insurer’s profits and destroy their financial stability. Id. Liddy stated offering insurance in
such storm-prone areas is “not a viable economic proposition for a company,” nor an industry.
Id. However, it is hard to accept the notion that it is not a viable market when Allstate made
$6.6 billion in premium earnings in Florida alone between the mid-1990s and the end of 2005.
Id.
213. John Gibeaut, Forces of Change, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 41, 46 (discussing the 2002
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act assisting insurance companies in the event of a major terrorist
attack); Lee, supra note 41, at A1 (discussing the National Flood Insurance Program covering
damage for those who had flood policies); Lipman, supra note 14, at 9A (discussing Congress’
consideration of a federal catastrophe fund).
214. Gibeaut, supra note 213, at 46.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 186 (providing an ISO sample policy excluding flood
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paid for much of the damage resulting from Hurricane Katrina under the
National Flood Insurance Program.221 In addition to refusing to insure against
flood damage, insurance companies further attempted, though unsuccessfully,
to avoid liability by putting the burden on policyholders to prove their losses
were not caused by Hurricane Katrina’s water.222 In preparation of a
Congressional hearing investigating the insurance industry, Mississippi
Attorney General Jim Hood expressed confidence that the House Homeland
Security Chairman would look into the insurance companies’ shifting the costs
of Hurricane Katrina’s damage to tax payers through the National Flood
Insurance Program and FEMA.223
In addition, several major insurers are attempting to shift the risk of loss to
the government by urging Congress to approve pending legislation that would
establish state and federal catastrophe funds.224 If enacted, this legislation
would establish a safety fund for insurance companies faced with great losses
resulting from natural disasters.225 The legislation requires insurance
companies to deposit a portion of policyholders’ premium payments into the
state funds, and the state funds would, in turn, contribute to the federal fund.226
The state funds would act as “tax-free piles of money” that secure insurance
companies during huge losses by allowing insurance companies to extract
money from the fund after paying a specified amount of money in satisfaction
of claims.227 When a catastrophe depletes a state fund, the insurance companies
can recover from the federal fund.228
Ironically, the legislation that would create state and federal funds speaks
only to the threat of insufficient funds for insurance companies to pay
policyholders even though the insurance industry recently recorded record
profits.229 Also, the national catastrophe fund would provide no additional
protection to policyholders, the funds merely redirect a portion of policyholders’
premium payments to state and federal funds designed to ensure the satisfaction
of claims after catastrophe.230 This is the assurance that the insurance contract
itself supposedly provides.

coverage).
221. Lee, supra note 41, at A1.
222. Id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.
223. Insurance Lawsuit Press Release, supra note 66.
224. Lipman, supra note 14, at 9A.
225. Herrndobler, supra note 14, at E1.
226. Id.
227. Flemming, supra note 158, at B5.
228. Herrndobler, supra note 14, at E1.
229. Gosselin, supra note 11, at A1.
230. Herrndobler, supra note 14, at E1.
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Insurers, on the other hand, benefit greatly from the catastrophe funds.
Among the proposed legislation before Congress is a bill that encourages states
to establish state catastrophe funds that would be secured by a new national
catastrophe fund,231 a bill that allows insurance companies to set aside pre-tax
money into disaster protection funds for payment of claims for future
catastrophes reducing their tax liabilities,232 and a bill that allows policyholders
to set aside twice the amount of their insurance deductible in a tax-free
investment account.233 Congressional approval of these measures would enable
insurance companies to place money in tax-free funds and draw on these funds
to satisfy claims as an alternative to purchasing expensive reinsurance.234 In
addition, the bill allowing policyholders to set aside twice the amount of their
deductible in a tax free account essentially encourages policyholders to prepare
for their claims to be denied.235 In light of their recent behavior following
Hurricane Katrina, it is no surprise that the bills are supported by insurance
companies.236 Although the pending legislation would theoretically benefit both
insurance companies and policyholders by avoiding the high costs of
reinsurance, the legislation does little to address the real problems policyholders
face following catastrophes. The pending legislation proposes a solution for
insufficient funds which, as evidenced by record profits, is not an existing
problem.237 The real problem, however, lies in how insurers handle claims.
Allowing insurers to further avoid responsibility for policyholders through state
and federal assistance does not solve the problems presented in claims handling
practices.
Rather than establishing government funds to further protect the insurer, the
government’s response should be directed at protecting policyholders by strictly
enforcing current laws and regulations regarding claims handling processes and
holding the insurance industry liable for violations of those laws and
regulations. Although holding insurance companies accountable and requiring
them to pay the full amount owed on claims may eventually result in a crisis of
insufficient funds, the industry is currently nowhere near financial insolvency.
Creating a national fund to assist an industry that fraudulently cheats its
policyholders out of proper payment and repeatedly acts in bad faith following
catastrophes only compounds the problem. In the event the insurance industry
is actually faced with insufficient funds, a catastrophe fund might prove to be
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Homeowners Insurance Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 91, 110th Cong. (2007).
Policyholder Disaster Protection Act of 2007, S. 926, 110th Cong. (2007).
Catastrophe Savings Accounts Act of 2007, H.R. 1787, 110th Cong. (2007).
Lipman, supra note 14, at 9A.
Id.
Id.
Gosselin, supra note 11, at A1.
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a proper solution. Nevertheless, until that time arises, the government should
decline to further aid insurance companies in avoiding liability by accepting
additional risks that insurance companies are being paid to bear.
C. Shifting the Risk to Global Reinsurance Companies
Over the past several years, insurers have shifted their risks by investing in
reinsurance—insurance bought by insurance companies.238 When obtaining
reinsurance, the insurance company pays the reinsurer part of the policyholders’
premiums, and the reinsurer assumes a portion of the risk of loss.239 In the
event of a major catastrophe, the reinsurer does not pay a policyholder’s claim
itself, but, rather, reimburses the insurer for the claims the insurance company
pays.240 Therefore, by purchasing reinsurance, the insurer increases the money
available to pay policyholders’ claims, resulting in the insurance company being
able to sell more policies.241 As a result of the protection afforded by
reinsurance, insurance companies can operate without maintaining billions of
dollars in capital.242
By investing in reinsurance, insurance companies have effectively
overextended themselves financially. Reinsurance has eliminated much of the
insurance companies’ risks associated with major catastrophes, allowing
insurance companies to engage in more risky business ventures. As a result,
insurance companies are issuing more policies and purportedly guaranteeing
more protection than their individual corporate structure can financially bear.
Although policyholders benefit greatly by the increased protection provided by
reinsurance, this protection becomes problematic when the insurance company
becomes over-insulated from liability. If the insurance company becomes too
far removed from the consequences and risks associated with its business
decisions, the insurance company could engage in overly risky behavior to the
detriment of the policyholders, thereby resulting in a crisis parallel to the
current mortgage lending crisis. In effect, an insurance company can issue
more coverage than it can financially bear because, in the event of a major
catastrophe, the burden of paying claims is shifted to the reinsurance company.
Although global reinsurance provides insurance companies much needed
protection against devastating losses, the insurance industry complains that
reinsurance has become too expensive.243 Insurance companies must transfer
238. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 6 (search “Glossary” for the term “reinsurance”).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Beatrice E. Garcia, Standing up to Insurance Catastrophes, MIAMI HERALD, July 3,
2006, at 11G.
243. Herrndobler, supra note 14, at E1.
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the cost of purchasing reinsurance to the policyholders.244 As a result, the
consistent increase in the market for global reinsurance causes the price of
policyholders’ premiums to simultaneously increase.245 The rising cost of
global reinsurance is a major factor in the push for a national catastrophe plan
and increased governmental involvement.246 Insurance companies that are no
longer willing to pay the high price to shift the risk to reinsurers now prefer to
shift the risk to the government. Either way, insurance companies are unwilling
to bear the risk of major catastrophes and continue to find ways to shift the risk
and avoid liability.
V. Changing Claims Handling Practices Following Catastrophes
The Oklahoma Legislature has implemented detailed legislation regarding
claim handling practices.247 The Oklahoma Insurance Code has an entire article
dedicated to claims settlement practices including a section describing fifteen
specific acts that constitute violations of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
Act.248 Although Oklahoma has sufficient laws to regulate claim handling
practices, insurers continue to take advantage of Oklahoma policyholders
during the claim settlement process.249 Because the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act does not provide a private right of action for violation, to prevent
insurance companies from taking advantage of policyholders during
catastrophes, the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner and the Oklahoma
Attorney General must advocate for policyholders and hold the insurance
industry accountable under current regulations.250
Oklahoma can implement a more strictly regulated insurance industry
through a restructuring the Department of Insurance and its practices. The
Insurance Commissioner’s role as an advocate for the insurance industry needs
to be changed back to the intended role as an advocate for policyholders.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Garcia, supra note 242, at 11G.
247. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5 (2001).
248. Id.
249. A unanimous jury found by clear and convincing evidence that State Farm
intentionally and with malice breached its duty to deal fairly and act in good faith while
handling the claims of over seventy known class members, although, under the class definition,
State Farm could be liable to thousands of Oklahoma policyholders. Journal Entry of
Judgment on Class Question Verdicts, Watkins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CJ-2000303 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 25, 2006), appeal docketed, No. DF-103756 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept.
13, 2006), appeal dismissed per stipulation, verdict vacated and confidential settlement
entered, No. DF-103756 (Jan. 12, 2007).
250. Gianfillippo v. Northland Cas. Co., 1993 OK 125, ¶ 4, 861 P.2d 308, 310 (holding that
“the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act provides no private right of action”).
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Additionally, criminal charges for violations of insurance laws and regulations
need to be aggressively pursued as a means of regulation. Because of the
immense profits insurers gain from corporate schemes to settle catastrophe
claims fraudulently and in bad faith, civil damages are often insufficient as a
means of changing insurers’ behavior.251 When the conduct of insurance
companies is so appalling that civil damages are an insufficient deterrent, the
threat of criminal charges may help internalize the costs of insurance
companies’ wrongdoings, thereby altering insurance companies’ cost-benefit
analysis, discouraging future violations, and improving outcomes for claimants.
The Oklahoma legislature has provided the tools for strict regulation of claims
settlement practices.252 The Oklahoma Insurance Code empowers both the
Insurance Commissioner and the Attorney General to take action in the event
of violations.253 The responsibility to enforce the standards set out by the
legislature now lies in the hands of these government officials to act as
advocates for Oklahoma policyholders.
A. Restructuring the Role of the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner
The Department of Insurance is a state agency established to enforce the
laws implemented by the legislature relevant to the insurance industry.254
Within the Oklahoma Insurance Code, the legislature empowers the Insurance
Commissioner with the authority to enforce the established standards.255 For
example, in the event of a violation of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
Act, the legislature mandates that the Insurance Commissioner issue a cease and
desist order directing the insurer to stop the unlawful practices.256 If the insurer
fails to comply with the order, the Insurance Commissioner is further
empowered to suspend the insurer’s certificate of authority and limit, regulate,
and control the insurer’s line of business, as well as regulate the insurer’s
volume of business.257 Although the Insurance Commissioner is seemingly
empowered with the tools necessary to regulate the insurance industry,
251. Jim Hood, the Mississippi Attorney General, is pressing charges against five insurance
companies, including Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,
Allstate Property and Casualty Co., and United Services Automobile Association, for
attempting to cheat Hurricane Katrina survivors out of millions of dollars regarding their
homeowners’ claims. Miss. AG Accuses, supra note 80.
252. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5.
253. Id. § 1250.13.
254. Dave Thomas, Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner Puts Pen to Paper, Resigns, INS.
J., Oct. 11, 2004, http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/southcentral/2004/10/11/
features/48875.htm.
255. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.13.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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particularly claims settlement practices, the Commissioner often fails to uphold
the standards articulated by the legislature.
Oklahoma has an unfortunate history of corruption within the Department
of Insurance.258 Insurance Commissioner Carroll Fisher was forced to resign
after felony charges of embezzlement and mismanagement of funds were
brought against him in 2004.259 The Assistant Attorney General alleged that
Fisher had engaged in a pattern of corruption while Fisher occupied the office
from 1998 to 2004.260 Furthermore, the Oklahoma House of Representatives
accused Fisher of neglect of duty, corruption, and incompetency.261 Although
the recently appointed Insurance Commissioner, Kim Holland, claims she is
working hard “to bolster the public’s confidence in the department,” the
Oklahoma Department of Insurance is currently far from satisfactory.262
Oklahoma is in need of a proactive Insurance Commissioner willing to be an
advocate for policyholders. The Insurance Commissioner has the responsibility
of receiving and processing complaints alleging violations of the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act.263 The Insurance Commissioner further has the duty
to initiate an investigation if the number and type of complaints do not meet
minimum standards of performance or are out of proportion to complaints
against other insurers.264 Because the Insurance Commissioner has the
responsibility of receiving all complaints, he or she is in the best position to
recognize when complaints against a particular insurer are out of proportion
and take the initiative to start an investigation on behalf of Oklahoma
policyholders. Nevertheless, if the Insurance Commissioner is advocating on
behalf of the insurance industry rather than policyholders— which seems to be
the present situation in Oklahoma—such investigations will never occur.
Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner Kim Holland has clearly expressed her
loyalty to the insurance industry. Holland, a former insurance agent for more
than twenty years, stated that her top priority during her tenure is dealing with
the issue of uninsured Oklahomans, noting that a number of Oklahomans are
not complying with compulsory insurance laws.265 Holland’s top priority
258. Oklahoma Commissioner Charged in Corruption Scheme, INS. J., Mar. 8, 2004,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/west/2004/03/08/features/39879.htm.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Thomas, supra note 254.
262. Holland Intends to Keep ‘Raising the Bar’ for Ethics and Integrity, INS. J., Sept. 25,
2
0
0
6
,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/southcentral/2006/09/25/features/73139.htm
[hereinafter Raising the Bar].
263. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.10 (2001).
264. Id.
265. Raising the Bar, supra note 262.
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appears to be providing more business to insurance companies rather than
assuring that insurance companies deal with existing policyholders in
compliance with the legislative standards. In addition, while discussing her role
as an intermediary between consumers and the insurance industry, Holland
excused most disputes as the result of policyholders merely being misinformed
or having a lack of understanding of the claim filing process, stating that
sometimes things just “fall through the cracks” at an insurance company.266
Other initiatives discussed by Holland include resolving complaints without
lawsuits, maintaining a competitive pro-business environment, reducing costs
to insurance companies, and giving independent agents the opportunity to
develop their business and conduct it how they choose.267 Although Holland is
a significant improvement upon her predecessor, the Oklahoma Department of
Insurance remains sub-par as an advocate for policyholders, particularly when
compared to other jurisdictions.
Mississippi’s Insurance Commissioner, George Dale, has initiated an
investigation regarding the handling of Hurricane Katrina claims.268 Dale plans
on performing market conduct examinations to investigate several major
insurance companies.269 Market conduct examinations consist of interviews
with Mississippi residents and a review of company files, followed by whatever
corrective actions are deemed necessary.270 Nevertheless, some critics are
disappointed with Dale for not doing more to hold insurance companies
accountable and have expressed hope that Dale would be a more aggressive
advocate for Mississippi policyholders.271 Robert Hartwig, the chief economist
for the Insurance Information Institute, stated that investigations such as those
conducted by Dale are routinely ordered following catastrophes, but serious
sanctions are rare.272 Although no serious sanctions have yet been enforced by
the Mississippi Insurance Commissioner, industry-wide market conduct
examinations are a step in the right direction toward a full investigation, an
initiative Oklahoma has yet to see.
California Insurance Commissioner, John Garamendi, is a prime example of
a proactive Insurance Commissioner who advocates for the state’s
policyholders. For example, following the Oakland firestorm catastrophe,
Garamendi brought action against Allstate Insurance Company and eight of its
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Michael Kunzelman, Miss. to Investigate State Farm: Katrina Claims Checked; Other
Insurers to Follow, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Nov. 22, 2006, at DSB8.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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agents alleging violations of California’s Unfair Practices Act,
misrepresentation, breach of duty, and failure to perform an expressly enjoined
duty.273 The actions were taken in response to a public meeting convened by
Garamendi following the Oakland firestorm in 1992, where hundreds of angry
policyholders testified about misleading marketing practices, a lack of good
faith in settlement offers, and other complaints.274
Because of these violations, Allstate was faced with penalties of more than
$2.5 million and suspension of its certificate of authority to provide
homeowners insurance.275 Agents faced revocation or suspension of their
licenses as well.276 Garamendi stated that these actions were intended to “send
a clear signal to insurance companies and agents that violations of insurance
laws and regulations will be vigorously prosecuted.”277 Garamendi embodied
the active role policyholders expect an insurance commissioner to assume
following a catastrophe. Garamendi held public meetings, investigated
complaints, set deadlines for claims to be settled, sent threatening letters to top
executives of major insurers, held investigatory hearings, imposed fines for
violations, and initiated market conduct examinations.278
Oklahoma
policyholders need a proactive Department of Insurance, like California’s, to
advocate for policyholders’ interests and ensure that Oklahoma’s insurance
laws and regulations are being adequately enforced.

273. John Schmeltzer, Allstate Oakland Fire Dealings Hit, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1992, at
1.
274. Oakland Fire Coverage up by $151M, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Aug.
31, 1992, at 4.
275. Larry Hicks, State Sues Allstate in Oakland Fire: Agents Misrepresented Coverage,
Insurance Commissioner Charges, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 24, 1992, at D1.
276. Id.
277. Don Martinez, Allstate Cited over Fire Claims: State Charges Stem from E. Bay Blaze,
S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 24, 1992, at A8.
278. Oakland Fire Coverage up by $151M, supra note 274, at 4.
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B. Utilizing the Power Given to the Attorney General
After a catastrophe, insurers can avoid paying millions of dollars in claims
by engaging in wrongful conduct, such as coercing structural engineers to preconstruct biased reports, using delay tactics during litigation, and encouraging
victims to sign waivers to receive immediate personal expense money.279
Unfortunately, the repercussions brought against the insurance company in a
civil suit for wrongful conduct are often not sufficiently burdensome to change
the insurance company’s behavior. To achieve reform in the insurance
industry’s claim handling practices the court must impose a penalty that will be
sufficiently harsh to weigh heavily on insurers’ cost-benefit analysis. Because
insurance companies accrue a substantial benefit through fraudulent and bad
faith practices, the penalty for such practices must be sufficiently great to
outweigh these benefits. Only then will insurance companies change their
behavior. For example, a $3 million verdict against a major insurer such as
State Farm, which had a net worth of $50.2 billion in 2005,280 may not be a
substantial cost.281 Because it is unlikely that a jury will ever render a verdict
sufficiently large to influence a major insurer’s policies, a better alternative
might be criminal charges against the decision-making executives.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Attorney General Jim
Hood has launched a criminal investigation into the conduct of several major
insurance companies regarding their claim settling conduct.282 Specifically,
Hood is investigating allegations that insurers encouraged victims to sign
waivers agreeing that their home was damaged from a flood in order to receive
immediate personal expense funds283 as well as allegations that State Farm
manipulated engineering reports to deny claims.284 While Hood is proceeding
with the criminal investigation, the threat of criminal charges is playing a
significant role in settlement negotiations with State Farm in Mississippi.285 If
the negotiations are successful, it will be the first mass settlement following the

279. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing biased engineering reports); supra Part III.A.2
(discussing delay tactics); see also The Latest on Katrina’s Aftermath, CNN.COM, Sept. 15,
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/15/news.update/index.html [hereinafter Katrina
Aftermath] (discussing insurance companies coercing policyholders to sign waivers).
280. State Farm Net Income, supra note 10.
281. A State Farm employee testified that $3 million was insignificant. Trial Transcript,
supra note 70, at 28.
282. Katrina Aftermath, supra note 279.
283. Id.
284. Judge Denies State Farm Bid to Stop Prosecutor from Reviewing Docs, INS. J., Apr.
13, 2006, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2006/04/13/67267.htm.
285. Lee, supra note 81, at A1.
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wave of litigation spawned by Hurricane Katrina.286 Perhaps coincidentally,
but seemingly strategically, Mississippi is the only state to initiate a criminal
investigation and the only state in which mass settlement negotiations have
begun.287 State Farm’s willingness to consider settlement negotiations hinged
on Attorney General Hood’s agreement to drop the criminal proceedings.288 The
direct link between the settlement negotiations and the criminal proceedings
indicate the persuasive effect the threat of criminal repercussions have on
getting policyholders’ claims paid.
While the threat of a criminal investigation seems to have a positive effect
on settlement negotiations and ensuring that policyholders’ claims are paid, the
effect that criminal charges will have on changing insurers’ corporate policies
regarding claims handling practices is still uncertain. Some policyholders in
Mississippi are extremely troubled by Attorney General Hood’s willingness to
use the criminal investigation as leverage to facilitate settlement.289 These
policyholders fear the government is allowing State Farm to buy their way out
of being penalized for criminal conduct, thereby increasing corporate arrogance
and encouraging wrongful behavior.290
Through the work of Mississippi Attorney General Hood, a glimpse of the
persuasive effect criminal charges can have on corporate executives can be
seen. Nevertheless, for criminal charges to be effective in changing corporate
policies of major insurance companies, the criminal charges must be carried out
to fruition. Rather than using criminal investigations to deal merely with the
issue at hand, the charges could be used on a grander scale to initiate a national
reform in the way insurance companies handle claims and deal with
policyholders.
The Oklahoma Insurance Code empowers the Insurance Commissioner to
seek the assistance of the Oklahoma Attorney General to carry out any penalties
or investigations involving an insurance company. 291 The Oklahoma
Legislature specifically empowered the Attorney General with the authority to
deal with violations of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.292 The
Attorney General and the Insurance Commissioner, together, have the capability
to enforce the standards set out by the legislature and reform the insurance
industry’s conduct within Oklahoma. Although insurance companies continue
286. Michael Kunzelman, State Farm Tries to Reach Accord on Katrina Claims, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 9, 2007, at 1.
287. See id.
288. Lee, supra note 81, at A1.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.13(A) (2001).
292. Id.
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to engage in illegal and wrongful practices that defraud and take advantage of
Oklahoma policyholders, there is no need to implement new regulations until the
current regulations have been adequately enforced and proven insufficient.
VI. Conclusion
The corporate arrogance that permeates the insurance industry gives
insurance companies the notion that they can treat policyholders however they
choose. Unfortunately, insurance companies have been caught preying on
policyholders at their weakest moment—following major catastrophes.293
Insurance companies have recently been hit hard by juries imposing massive
punitive damage verdicts for bad faith and fraudulent conduct committed while
settling catastrophe claims.294 Nevertheless, these multi-million dollar verdicts
may prove to be an insufficient deterrent of future misconduct in claims
handling practices. When discussing the insurance industry’s corporate
arrogance, Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood stated that “[a] $2.5 million
verdict to a $58 billion net-worth company like State Farm is a drop in the
bucket . . . . They’re not afraid of the U.S. government or the devil or God . .
. .”295
Although Oklahoma and other states have existing laws and regulations to
prevent such fraudulent and bad faith conduct,296 these laws are not being
implemented in an effective manner. Because policyholders have no private
right of action under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, the burden is
on the Insurance Commissioner and the Attorney General to ensure insurance
companies are adhering to the standards set out by the Oklahoma legislature.297
As advocates for policyholders, the Insurance Commissioner and the Attorney
General must impose consequences for violations that act not only as a
293. Watkins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CJ-2000-303 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 25,
2006), appeal docketed, No. DF-103756 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 13, 2006), appeal dismissed
per stipulation, verdict vacated and confidential settlement entered, No. DF-103756 (Jan. 12,
2007); see also Opinion on Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Broussard v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV6 LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 113942 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 11,
2007).
294. Journal Entry of Judgment on the Watkins Verdicts at 2, Watkins, No. CJ-2000-303
(imposing a $12,906,950 verdict consisting of $3 million in actual damages, $6 million in
punitive damages, and $3,906,950 for the Watkins’ share of the class punitive damages);
Judge Cuts Jury Award Owed by State Farm, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2007, at 6 (discussing a $2.5
million punitive damages award in Broussard, which was later reduced by the judge to $1
million).
295. Anita Lee, Verdict Sends a Message, Lawyers Say, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Jan.
12, 2007, at A7.
296. See, e.g., 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5.
297. Gianfillippo v. Northland Cas. Co., 1993 OK 125, ¶ 4, 861 P.2d 308, 310.
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punishment, but as a deterrent of future violations. Strict implementation of the
existing laws and regulations would serve to reform the insurance companies’
behavior and restore integrity to the insurance industry. As the CEO of State
Farm said, “If there’s any business where integrity is critical, it’s the insurance
business.”298
Kelsey D. Dulin

298. Edward B. Rust Jr., CEO, State Farm Ins. Co., Keynote Address at the International
Conference of the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business 2 (Apr. 22, 2005),
transcript available at http://www.aacsb.edu/handouts/ICAM05/Plenary%20I-%20Rust.doc.
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